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Abstract
We consider a 1-to-K communication scenario, where a source transmits private messages to K receivers through a broadcast
erasure channel, and the receivers feed back strictly causally and publicly their channel states after each transmission. We explore
the achievable rate region when we require that the message to each receiver remains secret - in the information theoretical sense
- from all the other receivers. We characterize the capacity of secure communication in all the cases where the capacity of the 1-
to-K communication scenario without the requirement of security is known. As a special case, we characterize the secret-message
capacity of a single receiver point-to-point erasure channel with public state-feedback in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
We find that in all cases where we have an exact characterization, we can achieve the capacity by using linear complexity
two-phase schemes: in the first phase we create appropriate secret keys, and in the second phase we use them to encrypt each
message. We find that the amount of key we need is smaller than the size of the message, and equal to the amount of encrypted
message the potential eavesdroppers jointly collect. Moreover, we prove that a dishonest receiver that provides deceptive feedback
cannot diminish the rate experienced by the honest receivers.
We also develop a converse proof which reflects the two-phase structure of our achievability scheme. As a side result, our
technique leads to a new outer bound proof for the non-secure communication problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication channels are easier to eavesdrop and harder to secure – even towards unintentional eavesdroppers.
As an example, consider a sender, Alice, who wants to send private messages to multiple (say three) receivers, Bob, Calvin
and David, within her transmission radius, and assume public feedback from the receivers to Alice. When Alice broadcasts
a message W1 intended for Bob, Calvin and David should also try to overhear, as the side information they possibly collect
can enable Alice to make her following broadcast transmissions more efficient; but then, this collected side information would
allow Calvin and David to learn parts of Bob’s message. Even worse, Calvin and David could try to put together the parts
they overheard, to extract increased information about Bob’s message. Can we, in such a setting, keep the message for each
user information theoretically secure from the other users, even if these nodes collaborate? Moreover, can we do so, when the
users can only communicate through shared wireless broadcast channels?
In this paper, we answer these questions when communication happens through a broadcast packet erasure channel with
public feedback. In particular, we assume that the receivers acknowledge through a public channel whether or not they correctly
received packets; this is a natural assumption that is aligned with the operation of current wireless standards. Recent results
justify the relevance of such an erasure model, e.g. [4] shows that a state dependent Gaussian channel can be viewed as a
packet erasure channel. We exactly characterize the capacity region in all the cases where the problem has been solved with no
security constraints, namely, the 2-user, 3-user, symmetric K-user, and one-sidedly fair K-user [5], [6] cases. For each such
case, we present a new outer bound and a polynomial time achievability scheme that matches it.
Our achievability schemes operate in two phases: in the first phase we efficiently generate secure keys between the source
and each of the receivers, while in the second we judiciously use these keys for encryption. In both phases, we exploit channel
properties to make our protocols efficient in terms of achieved rates.
In the first phase, we make use of a fundamental observation by Maurer [7]: different receivers have different looks on the
transmitted signals, and we can build on these differences with the help of feedback to create secret keys [8], [9]. For example,
if the sender – call her Alice – transmits random packets through independent erasure channels with erasure probability 0.5,
there would be a good fraction of them (approximately 25%) that only one of two users receives, and we can transform this
common randomness between Alice and the given user to a key using privacy amplification [7]–[10]. Testbed implementations
have demonstrated that a secret-key rate of several tens of Kbps is achievable by exploiting erasures in a practical wireless
setting [11], [12].
In the second phase, we use the generated keys to transmit private messages. A naive approach is to generate secret keys
of the same size as the size of the respective private messages, and then use these keys as one-time pads. However, this is too
pessimistic in our case: the other users are going to receive only a fraction of the encrypted messages. Thus, we can use keys
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2of smaller size than the messages, and still be secure. To build on this observation, feedback is useful; knowing which packets
a given user has successfully received, allows us to decide what to transmit next, so that we preserve secrecy from the others.
Our schemes assume that the users provide honest feedback, but they can be extended when this is not the case. To illustrate,
for the special case of K = 2, we design a scheme that provides secrecy for an honest user even if the other user provides
potentially false acknowledgments. Interestingly, we find that the same rate is achievable against dishonest users as against
honest-but-curious users. We note however that, although our scheme against dishonest users is optimal in terms of achieved
rates, its security relies on the uniform distribution of the message for the dishonest party. From a practical perspective such
an assumption is potentially too restrictive, which motivates us to define the new notion of distribution independent security
and design a scheme that fulfills this latter, stronger security notion. We also take the opportunity to investigate the relation
between different notions of security. In particular, following [13] we show equivalence between our security notions and
semantic security.
To prove the optimality of our achievability schemes, we derive a new impossibility result for the secure 1-to-K message
transmission problem, that applies for all values of K and any channel parameters. Our converse proof introduces a new
technique that explicitly utilizes a balance between generated and consumed keys, indicating that generating and using keys is
a natural strategy. As a side result, we provide a new proof for the known outer bound of the non-secure rate region derived
in [5], [6].
Finally, our work also provides the secure-message capacity of a point-to-point erasure channel with public state-feedback
in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. When no feedback is available, secrecy is achievable only if the legitimate
receiver has a channel of larger capacity than the wiretapper [14]. If public feedback is available, the work of Maurer proves
that a nonzero secret key generation rate is achievable as long as the eavesdropper does not have an error free channel [7]; in
this work we show we can also securely send specific messages, yet at rates lower than it is possible for key-generation. We
illustrate this in Figure 3.
To the best of our knowledge, this works provides the first characterization of secret-message capacity with limited public
feedback for a non-trivial setup.
II. RELATED WORK
We distinguish between secret-key exchange, where Alice and Bob wish to agree on a common secret securely from a
passive eavesdropper, Eve, and secret-message exchange, where Alice wants to send a specific message to Bob securely from
Eve.
For the wiretap channel, when there is no feedback from Bob, the rates for secret key and secret-message exchange coincide;
in his seminal work, Wyner derived the achievable rates of secure communication over a noisy point-to-point channel and
showed that unless Eve has a worse channel than Bob, the secure communication rate is zero [14]. These results on the
wiretap channel were generalized in several directions, see e.g. [15], [16]. The works of Maurer, Ahlswede and Csiszár have
shown that in contrast, if public feedback is available, we can achieve non-zero key generation rates even if Eve has a better
channel than Bob, thus establishing that public feedback can significantly increase the achievable secure key generation rates
[7], [17]–[19]. The wiretap channel with secure (inaccessible to Eve) feedback has been studied in [20]–[22]. Our work focuses
on the message exchange problem, and shows that for the case of erasure channels, public feedback also increases the secure
message exchange rate; yet, in this case, the message exchange capacity is smaller than the secret-key exchange capacity.
Our results go beyond the point-to-point channel to the case of sending private messages to multiple receivers. In addition,
in [7], [19] a public channel of infinite capacity is assumed, whereas we restrict the public feedback to a short channel-state
acknowledgment, which is more practical.
Recently there has been a number of interesting works that build on physical channel characteristics (such as channel
reciprocity) to derive key generation schemes [23], [24]. Our work focuses on erasure channels and on the message sending
problem [1], [2]. Secret-message exchange has also been studied over networks in the case where there are no channel errors
[25]; in our setup, the channel variability is what makes secrecy possible.
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, the use of feedback and broadcast for private message transmission without security
requirements has been studied in [6], [26], [27].
III. DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND
A sender, Alice, wants to send private messages to a set of K receivers: she wants to send message Wj to receiver j, so
that, no other receiver learns Wj , even if all other receivers collude.
A. Communication model
Communication takes place over a 1-to-K broadcast erasure channel, with input at Alice and an output at each of the K
receivers. We illustrate the setting in Figure 1. We also summarize our frequently used notations in Table I. The channel input
alphabet consists of all possible vectors of length L over a finite field Fq. For convenience, we usually call such a vector a
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Figure 1. 1-to-K broadcast erasure channel
Table I
SUMMARY OF NOTATION
Xi, Yj,i The ith input and outputs of the channel
Si, S
∗
i The actual and the acknowledged state of the channel in the ith transmission
δj Erasure probability for receiver j
Wj Private message for receiver j
PWi , PWi,Wj Distribution and joint distribution of messages Wi, Wj
σ1, σ2 Acknowledging strategy of a dishonest user
Nj Size of Wj expressed in number of packets
Rj Secret message rate for receiver j
ΘA,Θj Private randomness of Alice and of receiver j
packet. Throughout the paper we express entropy and rate in terms of packets. This enables us to omit the constant factor
L log q.
The broadcast channel is made up of K independent1 component erasure channels with packet erasure probabilities δ1, δ2, . . . , δK .
Below we define the channel formally (see Eq. (1)-(2)). We assume that the receivers send public acknowledgments after each
transmission stating whether or not they received the transmission correctly. By public we mean that the acknowledgments
are available not only for Alice but for all other receivers as well. We assume that some authentication method prevents the
receivers from forging each other’s acknowledgments. Also, receivers learn each other’s acknowledgments causally, after they
have revealed their own.
Let Si ∈ 2{1,2,...,K} denote the state of the channel in the ith transmission. Si collects the indices of receivers with correct
reception. In the first place, we assume that acknowledgments are honest. We relax this assumption for the special case of
K = 2.
We denote by Xi the ith transmission over the channel, and by Yi = (Y1,i, Y2,i, . . . , YK,i) the corresponding outputs
observed by the receivers. We use Xn to denote the vector (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). We use a similar notation for other vectors as
well. Formally, the channel behavior is defined as
Pr {Yi|Xi} =
K∏
j=1
Pr {Yj,i|Xi} (1)
∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} : Pr{Yj,i|Xi} =
{
1− δj , Yj,i = Xi
δj , Yj,i =⊥,
(2)
where ⊥ is the symbol of erasure.
We assume that all participants can generate private randomness at unlimited rate. We denote the private randomness of
the sender ΘA, while Θj is the private randomness of user j. Variables ΘA and every Θj are independent from all other
randomness in the system.
B. Reliability and security – honest-but-curious users
An (n, ǫ,N1, N2, . . . , NK) scheme sends message Wj which consist of Nj packets of length L to receiver j using n
transmissions from Alice with error probability smaller than ǫ. We denote W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WK) the set of all messages.
1We assume independence for simplicity, but as long as the statistical behavior of the channel is known, our results can be easily generalized.
4Definition 1. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2, . . . , NK) scheme for the 1-to-K broadcast channel consists of the following components: (a)
message alphabets Wj = FLNjq , j = 1, 2, . . . ,K , (b) encoding maps fi(.), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and (c) decoding maps φj(.),
j = 1, 2, . . . ,K , such that the inputs to the channel are
Xi = fi(W,ΘA, S
i−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (3)
where messages Wj ∈ Wj are arbitrary messages in their respective alphabets and ΘA is the private randomness Alice has
access to. Further, it provides decodability for each receiver, that is
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ K : Pr{φj(Y nj Sn) 6= Wj} < ǫ (4)
is satisfied.
Definition 2. The capacity region of the 1-to-K broadcast erasure channel RK ⊂ RK+ is the set of rate tuples for which for
every ǫ > 0 there exists an (n, ǫ,N1, N2, . . . , NK) scheme that satisfies
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ K : Rj − ǫ < 1
n
Nj (5)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K .
The following definition extends Definition 1 with a security requirement.
Definition 3. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2, . . . , NK) scheme is secure against honest-but-curious users if in addition to (3)-(4) the following
also holds for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K:
max
PW
I(Wj ;Y
n
−jS
nΘ−j) < ǫ, (6)
where the maximum is taken over all possible joint message distributions and Y n−j is a shorthand for Y n1 , . . . , Y nj−1, Y nj+1, . . . , Y nK .
Similarly, Θ−j is Θ1, . . . ,Θj−1,Θj+1, . . . ,ΘK .
Definition 4. The secret-message capacity region of the 1-to-K broadcast erasure channel RKH ⊂ RK+ is the set of rate tuples
for which for every ǫ > 0 there exists an (n, ǫ,N1, N2, . . . , NK) scheme that is secure against honest-but-curious users and
satisfies
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ K : Rj − ǫ < 1
n
Nj. (7)
Following [5] we distinguish two special cases.
Definition 5. We call the channel symmetric if the erasure probabilities are all the same: δi = δj, ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ K .
Definition 6. We call a rate vector one-sidedly fair if δi ≥ δj for i 6= j implies
Riδi ≥ Rjδj . (8)
C. Dishonest users
For the special case of K = 2 we introduce further, stronger notions of security. In particular, we aim to provide secrecy
against receivers who might acknowledge dishonestly. For convenience, we call the receivers Bob and Calvin. A dishonest user
can produce dishonest acknowledgments as a (potentially randomized) function of all the information he has access to when
producing each acknowledgment (this includes all the packets and the pattern of erasures he received up to and including the
current packet he is acknowledging and the acknowledgments sent by the other user over the public channel up to the previous
packet). In the following S1 and S2 denote the set of all possible acknowledging strategies of Bob and Calvin respectively
and σ1 ∈ S1 and σ2 ∈ S2 denote their elements.
We do not provide any guarantees for a dishonest user, hence at most one of the two receivers can be dishonest, otherwise
the problem would not be meaningful. Of course, the sender, Alice is not aware of which user is dishonest, otherwise she
could simply ignore the dishonest party.
Our security definition for the case of honest-but-curious users does not depend on the joint distribution of the messages.
In contrast, we define security against a dishonest user under three different assumptions on the joint message distribution
that correspond to different levels of security. First, we assume that messages are independent and uniformly distributed (see
Definitions 8-9). This models the case when messages are properly source-coded and the users have no control on them. Second,
we relax any assumption on the message distribution (see Definitions 10-11). This model even allows that the dishonest user
selects arbitrarily the joint distribution of the messages. Third, we assume that messages are independent and the message
of the dishonest user is uniformly distributed, but we do not make any assumption on the message distribution of the honest
user (see Definitions 12-13). In this model, the dishonest user might choose the distribution of only the other user’s message.
5According to another interpretation, in this case, the dishonest user might have side information about the message distribution
of the honest user. Security in this last model also ensures resistance against a chosen-plaintext attack.
We denote by S∗i the ith channel state based on the acknowledgments from Bob and Calvin. If there is a dishonest user,
then potentially Si 6= S∗i , thus Alice and the honest party do not have access to the true channel states. We need to modify
Definition 1 for K = 2 accordingly:
Definition 7. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme for the two user message transmission problem consists of the following components:
(a) message alphabets W1 = FLN1q and W2 = FLN2q , (b) encoding maps fi(.), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and (c) decoding maps φ1(.)
and φ2(.), such that if the inputs to the channel are
Xi = fi(W1,W2,ΘA, S
∗i−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (9)
where W1 ∈ W1 and W2 ∈ W2 are arbitrary messages in their respective alphabets and ΘA is the private randomness Alice
has access to. Then, provided the receivers acknowledge honestly,
Pr{φ1(Y n1 S∗n) 6= W1} < ǫ, and (10)
Pr{φ2(Y n2 S∗n) 6= W2} < ǫ. (11)
Security under uniform message distribution: The following definition extends Definition 7 with a security requirement
assuming that messages are independent and uniformly distributed.
Definition 8. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme is said to be secure against a dishonest user under uniform message distribution, if it
guarantees decodability and security for an honest user even if the other user is dishonest (as defined above). That is, if W1
and W2 are independent and both are uniformly distributed, then when Bob is honest,
max
σ2
Pr{φ1(Y n1 S∗n) 6= W1} < ǫ (12)
max
σ2
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2) < ǫ (13)
are satisfied, and when Calvin is honest,
max
σ1
Pr{φ2(Y n2 S∗n) 6=W2} < ǫ (14)
max
σ1
I(W2;Y
n
1 S
nΘ1) < ǫ. (15)
are satisfied. The maxima are taken over all adversarial acknowledging strategies.
Definition 9. The rate region R2uDH ⊂ R2+ is the set of rate pairs for which for every ǫ > 0 there exists an (n, ǫ,N1, N2)
scheme that is secure against a dishonest user under uniform message distribution and satisfies
R1 − ǫ < 1
n
N1 and R2 − ǫ < 1
n
N2. (16)
Distribution independent security: Below, we relax the assumption on the message distribution. This leads to a stronger
notion of security that we call distribution independent security.
Definition 10. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme is said to provide distribution independent security, if it guarantees decodability and
security for the honestly acknowledging user (or users) independently of the joint distribution PW1,W2 of (W1,W2). That is,
if Bob is honest,
max
PW1,W2 ,σ2
Pr{φ1(Y n1 S∗n) 6=W1} < ǫ (17)
max
PW1,W2 ,σ2
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2|W2) < ǫ (18)
are satisfied, and if Calvin is honest, then
max
PW1,W2 ,σ1
Pr{φ2(Y n2 S∗n) 6= W2} < ǫ (19)
max
PW1,W2 ,σ1
I(W2;Y
n
1 S
nΘ1|W1) < ǫ. (20)
are satisfied.
Definition 11. The rate region R2DIS ⊂ R2+ is the set of rate pairs for which for every ǫ > 0 there exists an (n, ǫ,N1, N2)
scheme that provides distribution independent security and satisfies
R1 − ǫ < 1
n
N1 and R2 − ǫ < 1
n
N2. (21)
6Security against a user with side information: In the following two definitions we assume that a dishonest user can choose
the message distribution of the other user, but not his own.
Definition 12. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme is said to be secure against a dishonest user with side information, if it guarantees
decodability and security for an honest user even if the other user is dishonest (as defined above) and can choose the message
distribution of the honest user. That is, if W1 and W2 are independent, then if W2 is uniformly distributed and Bob is honest,
max
PW1 ,σ2
Pr{φ1(Y n1 S∗n) 6= W1} < ǫ (22)
max
PW1 ,σ2
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2) < ǫ (23)
are satisfied, whereas if W1 is uniformly distributed and Calvin is honest,
max
PW2 ,σ1
Pr{φ2(Y n2 S∗n) 6= W2} < ǫ (24)
max
PW2 ,σ1
I(W2;Y
n
1 S
nΘ1) < ǫ (25)
are satisfied. The maxima are taken over all adversarial acknowledging strategies and all possible message distributions of
the honest user.
Definition 13. The rate region R2DH ⊂ R2+ is the set of rate pairs for which for every ǫ > 0 there exists an (n, ǫ,N1, N2)
scheme that is secure against a dishonest user with side information and satisfies
R1 − ǫ < 1
n
N1 and R2 − ǫ < 1
n
N2. (26)
D. Non-secure 1-to-K broadcast
Before summarizing our results, we restate the result from [5], [6] that characterizes RK in the known cases. Let π denote
a permutation of {1, 2, . . . ,K} and πi the ith element of the permutation.
Theorem 1. For K ≤ 3 or for a symmetric channel with K > 3 or for a one-sidedly fair rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ RK+ with
K > 3, the capacity region RK of the 1-to-K broadcast erasure channel with state-feedback is characterized by the following
inequality:
max
π
K∑
i=1
Rπi
1−∏ik=1 δπk ≤ 1, (27)
where the maximization is taken over all permutations π of {1, . . . ,K}.
Further, it was shown in [5] and [6] that (27) is an outer-bound for RK in all cases.
Theorem 2. Any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ RK+ in RK satisfies (27).
IV. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In this section we provide an overview of the results that we present in this paper.
A. Honest-but-curious users
Our main result for honest-but-curious users is the characterization of the secret-message capacity region RKH for sending
private messages to K receivers over a broadcast erasure channel, for all the cases where the capacity region without secrecy
constraints RK has been characterized, namely, the 2-user, 3-user, symmetric K-user and one-sidedly fair K-user cases.
For all the mentioned cases, when the capacity region RK is known, we prove the following theorem which describes the
corresponding secret-message capacity region RKH .
Theorem 3. For K ≤ 3 or for a symmetric channel with K > 3 or for a one-sidedly fair rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ RK+ with
K > 3, the secret-message capacity region RKH as defined in Definition 4 is characterized by the following inequality:
max
j∈{1,...,K}
Rj(1 −
∏K
k=1
δk
δj
)
(1− δj)
∏
K
k=1
δk
δj
(1−∏Kk=1 δk) + maxπ
K∑
i=1
Rπi
1−∏ik=1 δπk ≤ 1, (28)
where the second maximization is taken over all permutations π of {1, . . . ,K}.
We prove the achievability part of Theorem 3 constructively by describing a linear scheme that achieves any rate tuple in
RKH in the mentioned cases. The scheme together with the proof of its properties are given in Section V.
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Figure 2. Non-secure message sending and secret-message sending capacity regions for K = 2, δ1 = 0.7, δ2 = 0.5.
We also develop a converse proof to show that the scheme is optimal. Our converse proof inherently provides a new proof
of Theorem 2. We provide the converse proof in Section VII, which completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Comparing regions RK and RKH , the first term in (28) can be interpreted as the overhead for security. Indeed, in the scheme
that we present, there is a key generation phase whose duration is proportional to this term. In Figure 2, we visualize this
overhead for some specific parameter values.
B. Dishonest users
For the case of a dishonest user, we characterize the rate regions R2uDH ,R2DH . We focus on security against a dishonest
user with side information as defined in Definitions 12-13. In particular, we show that the same rates are achievable against
a dishonest user with side information as against honest-but-curious users, i.e., R2H = R2DH . This implies R2uDH = R2DH ,
hence our result on R2DH implicitly characterizes R2uDH as well. We provide a formal description and proof for K = 2, but
the same ideas extend for K > 2. The following theorem states that R2DH = R2H .
Theorem 4. The rate region R2DH as defined in Definition 13 is the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ which satisfy the
following two inequalities:
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1 − δ1δ2) +
R1
1− δ1 +
R2
1− δ1δ2 ≤ 1, (29)
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1 − δ1δ2) +
R1
1− δ1δ2 +
R2
1− δ2 ≤ 1. (30)
It is clear that R2DH ⊆ R2H , since the converse developed for the honest-but-curious case provides a valid outer bound. To
prove that the region given by (29)-(30) is achievable, we construct a linear scheme that is secure against dishonest users and
achieves any pair in the region. The scheme is described in Section VI.
Theorem 4 gives a complete characterization of the problem considering security against a dishonest user with side
information. Regarding distribution independent security we do not have such a characterization. We construct a scheme that
satisfies this stronger security definition, however its optimality is not clear. The next theorem gives the rate region achieved
by our scheme.
Theorem 5. If a rate pair (R1, R2) satisfies
R1(1 − δ2)
δ2(1 − δ1)(1− δ1δ2) +
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1 − δ1δ2) +
R1
1− δ1 +
R2
1− δ1δ2 ≤ 1, (31)
R1(1 − δ2)
δ2(1 − δ1)(1− δ1δ2) +
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1 − δ1δ2) +
R1
1− δ1δ2 +
R2
1− δ2 ≤ 1. (32)
then (R1, R2) ∈ R2DIS .
From the definitions it is clear that R2DIS ⊆ R2DH . We conjecture that there is a fundamental gap between R2DIS and R2DH ,
and R2DIS ⊂ R2DH holds, but we leave the proof an open question. The scheme that constructively proves Theorem 5 is given
in Section VI-D.
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Figure 3. Secret-message and secret-key capacities with and without state-feedback for δ = 0.4.
Security against an eavesdropper: Consider the special case when K = 2 and R2 = 0. There is only one receiver with
nonzero rate and we aim to secure his message against the other, dishonest party. In this setting the other receiver is equivalent
to a passive eavesdropper who overhears the communication. Note that the sender does not trust the feedback from the second
receiver, so this feedback is simply ignored. In other words, in this particular setting there is no difference between giving
potentially dishonest feedback and not giving any feedback at all. In the end, we have a broadcast channel with one receiver
and an eavesdropper against whom we aim to secure a message.
In the light of the argument above, the following definition naturally defines secret-message capacity against an eavesdropper.
Definition 14. The secret-message capacity CE of a broadcast erasure channel with state-feedback against an eavesdropper
is the largest R for which (R, 0) ∈ R2DH .
The following corollary characterizes CE . The result directly follows from Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. The secret-message capacity of a broadcast erasure channel with state-feedback against an eavesdropper is
CE = (1 − δ)δE 1− δδE
1− δδ2E
, (33)
where δE denotes the erasure probability of the eavesdropper and δ that of the legitimate receiver.
From Wyner’s result [14] it is well known that the secret-message capacity of the same setting but without any feedback
from the receiver is (δE − δ)+. Our result shows how feedback helps to increase the achievable rate of secure communication.
Corollary 1 also reveals the subtle difference between the secret-message sending and the secret-key generation problem.
It was shown in [7], [24] that in the same setting, a key that is secret from the eavesdropper can be established between the
sender and the legitimate receiver at rate δE(1 − δ), but the key is not known in advance by any of the parties. If we ask
that the sender specifies in advance the secret which becomes a shared secret between the sender and the receiver after the
protocol run, we arrive to the secret-message sending problem. From (33) it is clear that the rate δE(1− δ) is not achievable
in this case.
As a comparison, on Figure 3 we plot the secret-message capacity of the broadcast erasure channel against an eavesdropper
with and without feedback from the receiver as well as the secret-key capacity of the same setting. Note that without feedback
there is no difference between the secret-message sending and the secret-key generation problem.
V. HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS USERS
We prove the direct part of Theorem 3 by constructing a secure scheme against honest-but-curious users. At a high level,
our scheme consists of two phases:
1) Key generation. We create K pairwise keys, each key is shared between Alice and one of the receivers, and it is perfectly
secure from all the other receivers even if they collude.
2) Encrypted broadcast. Using the keys set up in the first phase, we employ an encrypted version of the non-secure 1-to-K
broadcast scheme as we describe shortly.
9Table II
AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROTOCOL RUN.
Alice sends Bob’s Calvin’s Bob’s key Calvin’s key Bob decoded Calvin decodedACK ACK
Key generation
{
X1 random X × KB,1 = X1
X2 random X X KB,1
X3 random × X KB,1 KC,1 = X3
Encrypted
message
transmission


X4 =W1,1 ⊕KB,1 × X KC,1
X5 =W2,1 ⊕KC,1 × X KC,1 W2,1
X6 =W2,2 ⊕KC,1 × × KC,1 W2,1
X7 = X6 X × W2,1
X8 = X4 ⊕X7 X X W1,1 W2,1,W2,2
In our second phase, we build on a modified version of the linear scheme presented in [5] that achieves RK as stated in
Theorem 1. We refer to this scheme as the non-secure 1-to-K achievability scheme. Conceptually, this algorithm has two main
steps:
Step (a): Alice repeats each message packet W1,1, . . .W1,N1 . . .WK,NK until at least one of the receivers correctly receives
it. We call j the intended receiver of a message packet Wj,i.
Step (b): Alice sends linear combinations of the packets that are not received by their intended receiver in Step (a).
A key contribution of [5] is in specifying how to construct the linear combinations in Step (b) – we refer the reader to [5] for
the exact constructions, and highlight here the two important properties that we rely on:
• A message packet successfully delivered to its intended receiver in Step (a) is never used in Step (b).
• The scheme achieves the rate points within RK as stated in Theorem 1.
A. Example
Before giving the detailed description of our scheme we show a small example which is suitable to highlight the ideas we
use to build our protocol.
Consider a setting with K = 2. For convenience, we call the sender Alice, and the two receivers Bob and Calvin. In
our example, Alice wants to securely send N1 = 1 message packet W1 = [W1,1] to Bob and N2 = 2 message packets
W2 = [W2,1,W2,2] to Calvin. The example protocol run is found in Table II.
Key generation:
(a) Alice transmits random (independent and uniformly distributed) packets X1, X2, X3. At the end of this phase, Alice and
Bob share a secret key packet KB,1 = X1 that Bob received and Calvin did not. Similarly, Alice and Calvin share the
secret key packet KC,1 = X3. The packet X2 which was received by both Bob and Calvin is discarded.
Encrypted message transmissions:
(b) Alice secures Bob’s first message packet with a one-time pad (using the secret key generated above) and repeatedly
transmits an encrypted packet until either Bob or Calvin receives. In our example, this happens immediately (X4). The
packet received only by Calvin is a side information which enables us to efficiently use the channel at a later point.
(c) In the next few transmissions (X5-X7) we do the same with Calvin’s packets. As we see, if only Calvin receives (X5), a
part of the message is successfully delivered, however the key used for encryption can be used again securely to encrypt
the next message packet (X6). If neither Bob nor Calvin receives (X6), the packet is simply repeated (X7).
(d) Once Bob also has a side information (X7) packet, we send the sum of the two side information packets thereby sending
information that is useful simultaneously for both receivers. This happens at transmission X8 = X4⊕X7, where both Bob
and Calvin can decode a novel message packet (X4 is for Bob, X7 is for Calvin). Note that at this step we do not need
any new keys to secure the transmission.
Through this small example we see the following important features of the scheme:
• The number of key packets we set up and consume is smaller than the number of message packets we convey per user,
because we can reuse certain keys if no other receiver has seen any packet encrypted with the given key.
• We exploit side information packets that users have about each other’s message to make a single transmission useful for
both, without consuming any new key.
B. Detailed description
We need to define a few parameters. The length of the secret keys we aim to set up for receiver j (expressed in terms of
packets) is kj , and the length of the key generation phase in terms of transmissions is n1. We define
kj = Nj
1−
∏
K
k=1 δk
δj
1−∏Kk=1 δk +

Nj 1−
∏
K
k=1 δk
δj
1−∏Kk=1 δk


3/4
, and n1 = max
j
kj + k
3/4
j
(1− δj)
∏
K
k=1 δk
δj
. (34)
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1) Key generation
Let Kj denote the key between Alice and receiver j.
Alice transmits n1 random packets X1, . . . , Xn1 generated uniformly at random over FLq . Kj is the vector of the first kj
packets Xi for which Si = j. If there are less than kj such packets, we stop and declare an error for receiver j. In other
words, Alice transmits random packets, and we treat a packet received by only one receiver as a shared secret between Alice
and that receiver.
2) Encrypted broadcast
We now follow the two transmission steps in the non-secure protocol, with the following modifications: in Step (a), we
encrypt the message packets using key packets as we specify in the following; in Step (b), we simply reuse the already
encrypted packets from Step (a) to create the required linear combinations – we do not use additional key packets.
Step (2.a): Before transmitting each message packet to receiver i, Alice encrypts it by XOR-ing it with a key packet that
has either not been used for encryption in the past, or if used, none of the other users received the corresponding packet.
Consider the transmissions to receiver j. Initially, Alice encrypts the first packet for j as Wj,1 ⊕Kj,1 and transmits it until
it is received by at least one of the receivers. If only receiver j receives this encrypted packet, she reuses the same key packet
Kj,1 to encrypt the next message packet. Subsequently, if for some i and ℓ < N1, k < k1: Xi =W ′j,ℓ =Wj,ℓ ⊕Kj,k, then
Xi+1 =


Xi, if Si = ∅
W ′1,ℓ+1 = Wj,ℓ+1 ⊕Kj,k, if Si = j
W ′1,ℓ+1 = Wj,ℓ+1 ⊕Kj,k+1, otherwise.
(35)
In other words, a key is reused until a packet encrypted using it is received by any other receiver. We declare an error if the
kj key packets are not sufficient to encrypt all the Nj message packets of Wj . Alice proceeds similarly for the other keys and
messages.
Step (2.b): At the end of Step (2.a), the receivers have received encrypted packets that are not intended for them as side
information. We use the same encoding as in Step (b) of the non-secure protocol to deliver these packets to their intended
receivers.
C. Analysis of the secure protocol
We need to show that conditions (3)-(6) are all satisfied. Condition (3) is obviously satisfied by construction. We show the
other required properties for receiver j, the same arguments apply to any j.
Security: We first argue that our scheme satisfies (6). From construction, at the end of the first phase we create a key Kj
with
I(Kj ;Y
n1
1 , . . . , Y
n1
j−1, Y
n1
j+1, . . . , Y
n1
K S
n1) = 0. (36)
In Step (2.a), every packet W ′j,ℓ that any of the other receivers receive has been encrypted using a different key packet Kj,i;
these key packets, from (36), are secret from Calvin and David. Thus the packets received by the K − 1 other receivers
together are one-time pad encrypted and hence perfectly secret to them, even if they collude. In Step (2.b), Alice transmits
linear combinations of packets W ′j,ℓ that have not been received by receiver j, but have already been received by at least one
of the other K − 1 receivers. Thus, assuming these receivers collude, they do not receive any innovative W ′j,ℓ. This concludes
our argument and shows
I(Wj ;Y
n
1 , . . . , Y
n
j−1, Y
n
j+1, . . . , Y
n
KS
n) = 0. (37)
Decodability: We next prove (4). Trivially, if no error is declared, receiver j can retrieve Wj from W ′j using his key Kj .
We show that the probability of declaring an error can be made arbitrarily small. It is enough to consider the following two
error events since the other error events are similar: (i) we do not obtain kj key packets for receiver j during the first phase,
and (ii) kj key packets are not sufficient in Step (2.a).
(i) Let κ denote the number of packets in the first phase that are received only by receiver j. Then, κ is the sum of n1
i.i.d. Bernoulli variables drawn from Ber(p), where p = (1− δj)
∏
K
k=1
δk
δj
. Thus,
E {κ} = n1p = n1(1− δj)
∏K
k=1 δk
δj
≥ kj + k3/4j .
The probability of error event (i) equals
Pr {κ < kj} ≤ Pr
{
E {κ} − κ > k3/4j
}
≤ Pr
{
|E {κ} − κ| > k3/4j
}
≤ e−c
√
kj , (38)
11
for some constant c > 0. The last inequality follows from the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [28]. Selecting N1 sufficiently large,
this error probability can be made arbitrarily small.
(ii) This error event is similar, it occurs if the number of packets that only Bob receives is significantly less than its expected
value, and the same technique can be applied to bound the probability of error. With this, we have shown that the scheme is
secure against honest-but-curious users as defined in Definition 3.
Rate of the scheme: Finally, as for (5), a straightforward calculation with the given parameters together with the capacity
achieving property of non-secure 1-to-K protocol shows that our proposed scheme achieves any rate tuple within the region
given by (28). For completeness, we provide the rate calculation in Appendix B. This concludes the proof of the achievability
part of Theorem 3.
VI. DISHONEST USERS
We consider the case when K = 2 and one of the receivers potentially acknowledges dishonestly. The security of the scheme
that we presented in the previous section crucially relies on honest feedback from all receivers. If we want to provide security
against dishonest users, then the secrecy of message Wj should rely only on the acknowledgment of receiver j. The scheme
we describe in this section provides this property.
A. Principles
The structure of the new scheme follows the two-phase structure described previously. However, when we create a key for
user j or when we send an encrypted packet to him, instead of the feedback of the other user, we rely on the expected behavior
channel. Interestingly, this does not require a sacrifice in rate as long as messages are independent and the message distribution
of the dishonest user is uniform.
For illustration, consider the key generation phase. Assume that Alice transmits three random packets X1, X2, X3, and
assume Bob receives X1, X2, while Calvin receives X2, X3 as seen in our example in Table II. If we cannot rely on Bob’s and
Calvin’s honesty, but we do know that Bob and Calvin have received at most 2 packets each, we could allocate K1 = X1⊕X2
as the key between Alice and Bob, and K2 = X2 ⊕X3 as the key shared by Alice and Calvin. Note that the number of such
linear combinations that we can securely produce is the same as number of key packets that we could set up assuming honest
feedback.
We can exploit the channel behavior also in the second phase such that we still have the property that the number of key
packets needed is less then the number of message packets to secure. Assume now that Bob has a key K1 = [K1,1,K1,2].
When we send encrypted packets to Bob, assume we expect Calvin to receive two out of three such transmissions – but
we do not know which two. We then create three linear combinations of Bob’s keys, say K ′1,1 = KB,1, K ′1,2 = KB,2,
K ′1,3 = KB,1⊕KB,2, and transmit W1,1⊕K ′1,1, W1,2⊕K ′1,2, and W1,3⊕K ′1,3. No matter which two of these Calvin receives
the message remains secret. Our protocol builds on these ideas.
B. Detailed description
Here we give the details of both phases. We observe that the dishonest user can deny the reception of side information
packets by which he can hinder the use of XOR-ed transmissions. The honest user must not experience any decrease in rate
even in that case. We limit the length of each step of the scheme to ensure this property.
The operation of the protocol utilizes a set of parameters which can be directly calculated before the protocol starts, and
whose use will be described in the following.
kB = N1
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2 +
(
N1
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
(39)
kC = N2
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2 +
(
N2
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
(40)
k1 =
kB
δ2
+
1
δ2
(
2kB
δ2
)3/4
k2 =
kC
δ1
+
1
δ1
(
2kC
δ1
)3/4
(41)
n1 = max
{
k1
1− δ1 +
(
k1
1− δ1
)3/4
,
k2
1− δ2 +
(
k2
1− δ2
)3/4}
(42)
n2,1 =
N1
1− δ1δ2 +
(
N1
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
(43)
n2,2 =
N2
1− δ1δ2 +
(
N2
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
(44)
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n′2,3 =
N1
1− δ1 +
(
N1
1− δ1
)3/4
− n2,1 (45)
n′′2,3 =
N2
1− δ2 +
(
N2
1− δ2
)3/4
− n2,2 (46)
n = n1 + n2,1 + n2,2 +max
{
n′2,3, n
′′
2,3
}
. (47)
Using our protocol, Alice attempts to send N1 message packets W1 = (W1,1, . . . ,W1,N1) to Bob and N2 message packets
W2 = (W2,1, . . . ,W2,N2) to Calvin using at most n packet transmissions. We show in Section VI-C that the probability she
fails to do so can be made arbitrarily small. She proceeds in two steps.
Key Generation
1) Alice transmits n1 packets X1, . . . , Xn1 generated uniformly at random.
2) If Bob receives less than k1 packets we declare a protocol error for him. Similarly, an error is declared for Calvin if he
receives less than k2 packets. When an error is declared for both users, the protocol terminates. If not, we continue with
the user not in error, as if the user in error did not exist.
3) Let XB1 be a L × k1 matrix that has as columns the first k1 packets that Bob acknowledged. Alice and Bob create kB
secret key packets as KB = XB1 GKB , where GKB is a (k1× kB) matrix and is a parity check matrix of a (k1, k1− kB)
maximum distance separable (MDS) code [29]. Similarly, using the first k2 packets that Calvin acknowledges, Alice and
Calvin create kC secret key packets using the matrix GKC . Matrices GKB , GKC are publicly known and fixed in advance.
Message encryption and transmission
Encryption
4) Alice and Bob produce N1 linear combinations of their kB secret key packets as K ′B = KBGK′B , where GK′B is a
(kB × N1) matrix and is a generator matrix of an (N1, kB) MDS code which is also publicly known. Similarly, Alice
and Calvin create N2 linear combinations of their kC key packets.
5) Alice creates N1 encrypted messages to send to Bob
UB,i = W1,i ⊕K ′B,i, i = 1 . . .N1, (48)
where ⊕ is addition in the FLq vector space. Let UB denote the set of UB,i, i = 1, . . . , N1. She similarly produces a set
UC of N2 encrypted messages to send to Calvin
UC,i = W2,i ⊕K ′C,i, i = 1 . . .N2. (49)
Encrypted transmissions
6) Alice sequentially takes the first encrypted packet from UB,i, i = 1 . . .N1, that is not yet acknowledged by either Bob
or Calvin and repeatedly transmits it, until it is acknowledged by either receiver. That is, if at time i Alice transmits
Xi = UB,j for some j < N1, then
Xi+1 =
{
Xi, if S∗i = ∅
UB,j+1, otherwise.
(50)
Alice continues these transmissions until all packets from UB are acknowledged or n2,1 transmissions are already made
in this step. In the former case, she continues with the next step. In the latter case, if Bob does not acknowledge N1(1−δ1)1−δ1δ2
packets, then he is considered to be dishonest and Alice continues with sending only Calvin’s packets using ARQ. Similarly,
if Calvin does not acknowledge N1(1−δ2)1−δ1δ2 packets, then he is considered to be dishonest and Alice continues with sending
only Bob’s packets. In case neither receiver is considered to be dishonest, still UB is not completely delivered, Alice stops
and an error is declared for both receivers.
7) Similarly, Alice sends not-yet-acknowledged encrypted packets from UC,i, i = 1 . . . N2, until either Bob or Calvin
acknowledges. If at time i Alice transmits Xi = UC,j for some j < N2, then
Xi+1 =
{
Xi, if S∗i = ∅
UC,j+1, otherwise.
(51)
Alice continues these transmissions until all packets from UC are acknowledged or n2,2 transmissions are already made
in this step. In the former case, she continues with the next step. In the latter case, if Bob does not acknowledge N2(1−δ1)1−δ1δ2
packets, then he is considered to be dishonest and Alice continues with sending only Calvin’s packets using ARQ. Similarly,
if Calvin does not acknowledge N2(1−δ2)1−δ1δ2 packets, then he is considered to be dishonest and Alice continues with sending
only Bob’s packets. In case neither receiver is considered to be dishonest, still UC is not completely delivered, Alice stops
and an error is declared for both receivers.
8) Let QB denote the set of packets that only Calvin acknowledged in Step 6. Similarly, QC denotes those packets that
only Bob acknowledged in Step 7. Alice sequentially takes packets from QB and QC . For each transmission, she takes
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the first packet from QB that Bob has not acknowledged together with the first packet from QC that Calvin has not yet
acknowledged and she transmits the XOR of the two packets. If at time i Alice transmits Xi = QB,j ⊕QC,ℓ for some
j < |QB|, ℓ < |QC |, then
Xi+1 =


Xi, if S∗i = ∅,
QB,j+1 ⊕QC,ℓ, if S∗i = {1},
QB,j ⊕QC,ℓ+1, if S∗i = {2},
QB,j+1 ⊕QC,ℓ+1, if S∗i = {1, 2}.
(52)
Alice continues with the XOR-ed transmissions until either receiver acknowledges all his packets. If Bob has already acknowl-
edged all packets from QB , Alice repeats packets that are not yet acknowledged by Calvin from QC . Similarly, if Calvin has
already acknowledged all packets from QC , then Alice continues with repeating the remaining packets for Bob from QB .
If at any point, the overall number of transmissions would exceed n as defined in (47) we stop and declare an error for the
party (or parties) who has not acknowledged all his encrypted message packets.
C. Analysis
Below, we prove that the above scheme is secure against a dishonest user with side information and runs without error with
high probability. The rate assertion of the theorem follows from a simple numerical evaluation with the given parameter values.
1) Security: In our argument we focus on the secrecy of W1 against a dishonest Calvin, but the same reasoning works for
W2 against a dishonest Bob as well. Since we do not intend to give security guarantees to a dishonest user and consider at
most one user to be dishonest, we may assume that Bob is honest. Moreover, under our definition of dishonest user with side
information, W1 and W2 are independent and the latter is uniformly distributed over its alphabet, but the distribution of W1
is arbitrary and controlled by the dishonest Calvin.
To analyze the secrecy of W1, we may, without loss of generality, assume that no error was declared for Bob during the
key generation phase. Recall that an error is declared for Bob only if Bob fails to acknowledge at least k1 packets. If an error
was in fact declared for Bob, no information about Bob’s message W1 is ever transmitted by Alice. However, note that we do
account for this error event when we analyze the probability of error for Bob in the Section VI-C2.
We need to show that the secrecy condition (23) is satisfied by the scheme, i.e., Bob’s message remains secret from Calvin
even if Calvin controls the distribution of W1, and applies any acknowledging strategy. In the proof we omit taking the
maximum, but the argument holds for any PW1 and for any adversarial strategy, so the statement follows.
We use the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1. When Bob is honest and no error is declared for Bob in the key generation phase,
I(KB;Y
n1
2 S
n1) ≤ kBe−c1
√
k1 , (53)
if k1 = kBδ2 + 1δ2
(
2kB
δ2
)3/4
and kB ≥ 2δ2 , where c1 > 0 is some constant. Moreover, KB is uniformly distributed over its
alphabet.
Lemma 1 shows that I(KB;Y n12 Sn1) can be made small, i.e., the key generation phase is secure. The key facts we use in
proving this lemma are (i) the number of packets seen by Calvin concentrates around its mean and (ii) an MDS parity check
matrix can be used to perform privacy amplification in the packet erasure setting. The proof is delegated to Appendix A-A.
Let 1CB,i be the indicator random variable for the event that Calvin observes the packet UB,i either in its pure form or in a
form where the UB,i packet is added with some UC,j packet. Let MCB be the random variable which denotes the number of
distinct packets of UB that Calvin observes, so MCB =
∑N1
i=1 1
C
B,i. Given this notation, we have the following lemmas:
Lemma 2. H(Y n2 |Y n12 SnΘ2UC) ≤ E
{
MCB
}
.
We prove Lemma 2 in Appendix A-B.
Lemma 3. H(Y n2 |W1Y n12 SnΘ2UC) ≥ E
{
min
(
kB,M
C
B
)}− I(KB;Y n12 Sn1).
We prove Lemma 3 in Appendix A-C.
Using the results of Lemmas 1-3, we conclude the proof as follows. We have that
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2) ≤ I(W1;Y n2 SnΘ2UC) = I(W1;Y n2 |Y n12 SnΘ2UC), (54)
where the last equality used the fact that ΘA,Θ2,W2, Sn are independent of W1 and we may express Y n12 , UC as deterministic
functions of ΘA,Θ2,W2, Sn. We use Lemmas 2-3 in (54), to get
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2) ≤ E
{
max
(
0,MCB − kB
)}
+ I(KB;Y
n1
2 S
n1). (55)
14
Lemma 1 gives a bound for the second term. We bound the first term using concentration inequalities, in particular, we use
the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [28] for the purpose. In order to do this, let ZB,i be the number of repetitions of a packet UB,i
that Alice makes until Bob acknowledges it (where we count both the transmission in pure form and in addition with some
packet from UC ). Note that the random variables ZB,i are independent of each other and have the same distribution. This
follows from the fact that the Si sequence is i.i.d., and each Si is independent of (Y i−12 , Si−1,Θ2). In other words, Calvin
can exert no control over the channel state. Further, for the same reason, with every repetition the chance that Calvin obtains
the transmission is 1− δ2. This implies that the indicator random variables 1CB,i are i.i.d. with
Pr
{
1CB,i = 1
}
= (1− δ2) + δ1δ2(1 − δ2) + . . . = 1− δ2
1− δ1δ2 . (56)
Notice that MCB is a sum of N1 such independent random variables, and hence E
{
MCB
}
= N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 . Since kB = N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 +(
N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2
)3/4
, by applying Chernoff-Hoeffding bound we have
E
{
max
(
0,MCB − kB
)} ≤ N1 Pr{MCB > kB} ≤ N1e−c2√N1 , (57)
for a constant c2 > 0. Substituting this back to (55) and using Lemma 1, we get
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2) ≤ N1e−c2
√
N1 + kBe
−c2
√
kB , (58)
for constants c1, c2 > 0. By choosing a large enough value of N1, we may meet (23)2.
2) Error probability: We need to bound the probability that an error is declared for Bob. If there is no error for Bob, he
will be able to decode W1. An error happens if (i) Bob receives less than k1 packets in the first phase, or (ii) he does not
receive enough encrypted message packets in Steps 6 and 8 before the protocol terminates. These error events have the same
nature as the error events of our scheme for honest-but-curious users. An error happens if Bob collects significantly fewer
packets than he is expected to receive in a particular step. The probability of these events can be made arbitrarily small by
applying the same technique as in Section V-C. We omit details to avoid repetitive arguments.
A straightforward computation using the parameters in (40)-(47) shows that the achieved rate region matches the region
claimed in Theorem 4. We give the calculation in Appendix B.
3) Complexity considerations: It is clear from the analysis in Section VI-C that the length n of the scheme grows as
max{O(log2(1ǫ ), O( 1ǫ′4 ))}, where ǫ is the security and probability of error parameter, and ǫ′ is the gap parameter associated
with the rate. The algorithmic complexity is quadratic in n; quadratic from the matrix multiplication to produce the key.
D. Distribution independent scheme
In the following we describe a scheme which satisfies distribution independent security as defined in Definition 10. Before
that we provide the intuition behind the construction. The protocol in Section VI cannot satisfy distribution independent security,
because of the following. Assume Calvin knows his message a-priori and he acknowledges dishonestly in the key generation
phase. Then, KC is constructed of packets that Calvin does not know, but in the second phase, Alice uses this KC to encrypt
his message. If Calvin acknowledges honestly in the second phase, then he learns KC from UC , because he already knows W2.
Since KC is a linear combination of key generation packets, this way Calvin might learn (in expectation) a n1(1− δ2) + kC
dimension subspace from the space spanned by the key generation packets. The expected number of key generation packets
that either Bob or Calvin receives is n1(1− δ1δ2) and for a large n, n1(1− δ2) + kC + kB > n1(1− δ1δ2), hence KB is not
independent of Calvin’s observation, which means that Bob’s key is not secure.
We can overcome this issue if we modify the key generation phase and make sure that no packet used in generating Calvin’s
key is contributing Bob’s key, thus UC is conditionally independent of Bob’s key given Calvin’s observation of the protocol
and W2. This results in two separate key generation phases, one for Bob and one for Calvin.
1) Protocol description: We need two parameters for determining the number of key generation packets.
n1,1 =
k1
1− δ1 +
(
k1
1− δ1
)3/4
, n1,2 =
k2
1− δ2 +
(
k2
1− δ2
)3/4
. (59)
We use all other parameters and notations as introduced in Section VI.
Key Generation
1) Alice transmits n1,1 uniformly random packets X1, . . . , Xn1 independent of W1, W2. From the first k1 packets that Bob
acknowledges (matrix XB1 ) Alice computes Bob’s key as KB = XB1 GKB . If Bob does not acknowledge k1 packets we
declare an error for him.
2) Alice transmits n1,2 uniformly random packets Xn1+1, . . . , Xn1+n2 independent of W1, W2. From the first k2 packets
that Calvin acknowledges out of these n1,2 packets (matrix XC1 ), Alice computes Calvins’s key as KC = XC1 GKC . If
Calvin does not acknowledge k1 packets we declare an error for him.
2Recall from (40)-(47) that by saying that we choose N1 large enough we cause n to be large enough.
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3) When an error is declared for both users, the protocol terminates. If not, we continue with the user not in error, as if the
user in error did not exist.
Message encryption and transmission
Steps 4-8 are exactly the same as described in Section VI.
This scheme provides distribution independent security, which property is proved in Appendix C. The proof follows the same
lines as the analysis of Section VI-C. This, together with a straightforward rate calculation completes the proof of Theorem 5.
VII. CONVERSE
We show the converse part of Theorem 3, by which we conclude the proof of Theorems 3, 4 and Corollary 1. This result
proves the optimality of the schemes presented in Section V and in Section VI.
Proof: We present our proof for K = 3, the generalization of the same argument for any K is straightforward. We are
going to show that for any j and any π
Rj(1− δ1δ2δ3δj )
(1− δj) δ1δ2δ3δj (1− δ1δ2δ3)
+
Rπ1
1− δπ1
+
Rπ2
1− δπ1δπ2
+
Rπ3
1− δπ1δπ2δπ3
≤ 1 (60)
holds, which implies the statement of the theorem. Also, to avoid cumbersome notation we show (60) for j = 1 and π = (1, 2, 3).
With simple relabeling, the same argument holds for any j and π.
n ≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−11 Si−1) =
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y i−11 Si−1) (61)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y i−11 Si−1) + I(Xi;Y i−13 |Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) (62)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|W1W2W3Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) (63)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y i−11 Si−1) (64)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
3 |Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) (65)
+ I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) (66)
In the following Lemmas 4-7 we give bounds on each of the terms (63)-(66). Combining these results together gives (60) and
in turn the statement of the theorem. The detailed proofs of these lemmas are delegated to Appendix D.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: It is sufficient to prove the inequality for π = (1, 2, 3). By relabeling, the same argument holds for any π. By
repeating the first steps of the previous proof and bounding term (63) by 0, we have
n ≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y i−11 Si−1) (67)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
3 |Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) (68)
+ I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) (69)
Lemmas 5-7 give bounds on terms (67)-(69) respectively. Combining these gives the stated inequality.
B. Interpretation of the converse proof
To facilitate understanding, beside our formal proof through Lemmas 4-10 here we provide some intuitive interpretation of
terms (63)-(66) and of the inequalities we derive. It will be helpful to match terms to the steps of our scheme, but we stress
that the proof holds for any possible scheme.
In Lemma 4 we see the following (here we omit small terms for simplicity):
(1− δ1)δ2δ3
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 W1W2W3Si−1) ≥
nR1(1− δ2δ3)
1− δ1δ2δ3 . (70)
The entropy term on the LHS of this inequality accounts for fresh randomness sent by the source. In or scheme we call this
the key generation phase. The constant factor (1− δ1)δ2δ3 suggests that a random packet becomes a key for receiver 1 if only
he receives the transmission. The RHS of the inequality corresponds to the expected number of (encrypted) W1 packets that
not only receiver 1 gets, but some other receivers also overhear. These are the packets that need to be secured, thus for perfect
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secrecy, receiver 1 needs at least the same number of key packets. This lower bound on term (63) suggests that any scheme
has to introduce some source randomness. We find it natural to call it key generation.
Terms (64)-(66) correspond to the second phase of our protocol. Term (66) corresponds to the first step of the message
transmission phase (see Step (a)), when the sender ensures that the receivers together could decode all the messages. Terms (64)-
(65) account for the encoded transmissions. E.g. (64) intuitively corresponds to “a packet that is of interest for receiver 1 and
known by receiver 2”. Indeed, Lemma 5 lower bounds this term with the expected number of transmissions that are needed
to convey to receiver 1 the side information overheard by receiver 2.
C. Lemmas
Here we state the lemmas that we use in the converse proof. The proofs of the lemmas are found in Appendix D.
Lemma 4. From conditions (3)-(7) it follows that
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 W1W2W3Si−1) ≥
nR1(1− δ2δ3)
(1− δ1)δ2δ3(1− δ1δ2δ3) − E8, (71)
where E8 = E7 1−δ2δ3(1−δ1)δ2δ3 , and E7 is an error constant specified in Lemma 10.
Lemma 5. From conditions (3)-(7) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y i−11 Si−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1 −
nR1
1− δ1δ2 − E1, (72)
where E1 = h2(ǫ)+ǫ1−δ1 .
Lemma 6. From conditions (3)-(7) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
3 |Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) ≥
n(R1 +R2)
1− δ1δ2 −
n(R1 +R2)
1− δ1δ2δ3 − E2, (73)
where E2 = h2(2ǫ)+2ǫ1−δ1δ2 .
Lemma 7. From conditions (3)-(7) it follows that
n(R1 +R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3 − E3 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) ≤
n(R1 +R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3 (74)
where E3 = h2(3ǫ)+3ǫ1−δ1δ2δ3 .
Lemma 8. From the definition of the channel it follows that
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 W1W2W3Si−1) ≥
1− δ2δ3
(1 − δ1)δ2δ3
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y i−12 Y i−13 W1W2W3Si−1) (75)
Lemma 9. From the security condition (6) it follows that
E4 >
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1), (76)
where E4 = ǫ1−δ2δ3 .
Lemma 10. From conditions (3)-(6) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1W2W3) ≥
nR1
1− δ1δ2δ3 − E7, (77)
where E7 = 2E ′2 + E4 + E5 + E6, E5 = h2(ǫ)+ǫ1−δ2δ3 , E6 =
h2(ǫ)+ǫ
1−δ1δ2δ3 , and E ′2 =
h2(2ǫ)+2ǫ
1−δ2δ3 .
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VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Channels with correlated erasures
Our results can be generalized for memoryless channels with arbitrary correlation between the erasure events. We consider
the case of honest-but-curious users. Let δN denote the erasure probability that the set N of receivers jointly experience and
pj the probability that only user j receives:
δN = Pr {∀j ∈ N : Yj,i =⊥} (78)
pj = Pr {Yj,i = Xj,i, ∀k 6= j : Yk,i =⊥} . (79)
Our outer bound proof relies on knowing the statistical behavior of the channel but not on its independence property. Using
the parameters defined above, a straightforward generalization of the proof in Section VII results in a more general bound:
any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ RK+ in RKH satisfies
max
j∈{1,...,K}
Rj(1− δ{−j})
pj(1− δ{1,...,K}) + maxπ
K∑
i=1
Rπi
1− δ{π1,...,πi}
≤ 1, (80)
where δ{−j} is used as a shorthand for δ{1,...,j−1,j+1,...,K}.
Our arguments for the key generation phase also do not exploit the independence property of the channel. It follows that
for the broadcast erasure channel the upper bound on the achievable key generation rate for user j
max I(Xi;Yj,i|Y1,i, . . . , Yj−1,i, Yj+1,i, . . . , YK,i) = pj (81)
derived in [7] is achievable without the requirement of independent erasures. In the parameter definitions and proofs pj is
substituted as the key generation rate for user j. Consider our parameter definitions for honest-but-curios users in eq. (34).
With this modification,
kj = Nj
1− δ{−j}
1− δ{1,...,K} +
(
Nj
1− δ{−j}
1− δ{1,...,K}
)3/4
, and n1 = max
j
kj + k
3/4
j
pj
. (82)
The second phase of our achievability algorithm (Step (2.b)) uses a capacity achieving non-secure coding scheme. For the
cases where such a scheme is available (for non-secure coding schemes we refer the reader to [5]), our secure protocol naturally
extends for a channel with correlated erasures.
B. Security notions
We formulate our results in information theoretic terms, defining secrecy as a mutual information term being negligibly
small. In the realm of computational cryptography it is more common to prove security of an encryption scheme by showing
distinguishing security or semantic security. To facilitate the interpretation of our results and to allow a fair comparison
with other schemes, we cite a recent result from [13], which shows equivalence between the two approaches. However, the
definitions of distinguishing security and semantic security are applicable only for a single user setting. We can directly use
these definitions for the special cases when R1 = 0 or R2 = 0, i.e., when we consider security against an eavesdropper. In these
cases, our definition of security against a dishonest user with side information is equivalent to semantic security. We extend the
notion of semantic security such that it handles joint message distributions, which results in a definition matching distribution
independent security. We will give the definitions for Bob’s security, the security for Calvin is completely symmetric.
It is common to define the advantage of the adversary to express the gain that the adversary obtains by observing the
protocol. Considering security against an eavesdropper, the adversarial advantage expressed in terms of mutual information
(mis = mutual information security) is defined as:
Adv
mis = max
PW1 ,σ2
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2). (83)
The notion of semantic security captures the intuition that the probability that an adversary can compute a function f of the
message should not increase significantly after observing the protocol compared to the a-priori probability of a correct guess.
The semantic security advantage is defined as
Adv
ss = max
f,PW1 ,σ2
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , Sn, σ2) = f(W1)} −maxS Pr {S(PW1 , f) = f(W1)}
}
, (84)
where f is an arbitrary function of W1, A is any function that the adversary may compute after observing the protocol and S is a
simulator trying to compute f without accessing the protocol output. Here also, W2 is uniformly distributed and independent of
W1. The term simulator to denote guessing functions comes from the intuition that ideally there exists an algorithm (simulator)
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that simulates the run of a protocol without having access to the message and whose output is indistinguishable from the output
of a real protocol. Theorems 1, 5 and 8 from [13] prove the following inequalities:
Adv
ss ≤
√
2 ·Advmis; Advmis ≤ 4 ·Advss log
(
2n
Adv
ss
)
(85)
This result shows that requirement (23) is naturally equivalent to semantic security. i.e., a small ǫ in (23) implies that Advss
is also small.
Applying the above definition for a case when R2 > 0 implicitly assumes that Calvin cannot choose the distribution of his
own message W2. We now extend the definition of semantic security such that it does not rely on the distribution of W2,
which results in a stronger notion of security. We define the adversarial advantage for this case as
Adv
ss
dis = max
f,PW1,W2 ,σ2
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , Sn, σ2,W2) = f(W1,W2)} − maxS Pr {S(PW1,W2 , f,W2) = f(W1,W2)}
}
. (86)
Note that here we allow the simulator to have access to the message W2 which an honest Calvin will learn. The corresponding
definition of adversarial advantage for distribution independent security directly comes from (18):
Adv
mis
dis = max
PW1,W2 ,σ2
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2|W2) (87)
We show in Appendix E the following lemma, which implies that requirement (18) is equivalent to this extended notion of
semantic security.
Lemma 11.
Adv
ss
dis ≤
√
2 ·Advmisdis (88)
Adv
mis
dis ≤ 4 ·Advssdis log
(
2n
Adv
ss
dis
)
. (89)
These results show that although security definitions might look quite different at first sight, there is no fundamental difference
between these notions of security. As a corollary, our results also characterize the rate regions that are achievable by any scheme
that provides semantic security.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMAS IN SECTION VI-C
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: With a slight abuse of notation, in the following XBC1 will denote the actual packets Calvin received (not necessarily
the same as those that he acknowledges) out of the first k1 packets that Bob received. Note that here we assume that an error
was not declared for Bob in the key generation phase and hence Bob did receive at least k1 packets in the key generation
phase. Also let XB∅1 be the packets seen only by Bob among the first k1 he receives. Let IB∅ and IBC be the index sets
corresponding to XB∅1 and XBC1 . Recall that XB1 denotes the first k1 packets received by Bob. The notation M I will denote
a matrix M restricted to the columns defined by index set I . Given this,
I(KB;Y
n1
2 S
n1) = I(XB1 GKB ;X
BC
1 S
n) (90)
= H(XB1 GKB )−H(XB1 GKB |XBC1 Sn) (91)
= kB −H(XB1 GKB |XBC1 Sn) (92)
= kB −H(
[
XB∅1 G
IB∅
KB
XBC1 G
IBC
KB
]
|XBC1 Sn) (93)
= kB −H(XB∅1 GIB∅KB |XBC1 Sn) (94)
= kB −H(XB∅1 GIB∅KB |Sn), (95)
where the third equality follows from the MDS property of the matrix GKB . Using the same property, we have
H(XB∅1 G
IB∅
KB
|Sn) =
k1∑
i=0
min{i, kB}L log qPr
{
|XB∅1 | = i
}
(96)
≥ kB
k1∑
i=kB
Pr
{
|XB∅1 | = i
}
(97)
= kB Pr
{
|XB∅1 | ≥ kB
}
(98)
= kB
(
1− Pr
{
|XB∅1 | < kB
})
(99)
= kB
(
1− Pr{|XBC1 | ≥ k1 − kB}) (100)
(a)≥ kB
(
1− Pr
{
|XBC1 | ≥ (1− δ2)k1 + k13/4
})
(101)
≥ kB
(
1− Pr
{∣∣|XBC1 | − E [|XBC1 |]∣∣ > k13/4}) , (102)
where the inequality (a) follows from the fact that the conditions on kB and k1 imply that
k1 − kB ≥ (1− δ2)k1 + k13/4.
The Chernoff-Hoeffding bound gives that for some constant c1 > 0
Pr
{∣∣|XBC1 | − E [|XBC1 |]∣∣ > k13/4} ≤ e−c1√k1 . (103)
So, we have that
I(KB;Y
n1Sn) ≤ kBe−c1
√
k1 . (104)
The final assertion of the lemma is a simple consequence of the MDS property of the code and the fact that Xn1 are
uniformly i.i.d.
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B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: Let UCB be a vector of length N1 such that the i-th element UCB,i is UB,i if Calvin observes this UB,i either in
the pure form or added with some element of UC , and UCB,i =⊥ otherwise. Let 1CB,i is the indicator random variable for the
event UCB,i 6=⊥, so MCB =
∑N1
i=1 1
C
B,i. It is easy to see that the following are information equivalent (i.e., we can express each
side as a deterministic function of the other)
(Y n2 , S
n,Θ2, UC) ≡ (UCB , Y n12 , Sn,Θ2, UC).
Therefore,
H(Y n2 S
nΘ2UC) = H(U
C
BY
n1
2 S
nΘ2UC).
H(Y n2 |Y n12 SnΘ2UC) = H(UCB |Y n12 SnΘ2UC) (105)
=
N1∑
i=1
H(UCB,i|UC i−1B Y n12 SnΘ2UC) (106)
=
N1∑
i=1
H(UCB,i|1CB,iUC i−1B Y n12 SnΘ2UC) (107)
≤
N1∑
i=1
H(UCB,i|1CB,i) (108)
≤
N1∑
i=1
Pr
{
1CB,i = 1
}
= E
{
N1∑
i=1
1CB,i
}
. (109)
where the third equality follows from the fact that the indicator random variable 1CB,i is a deterministic function of the
conditioning random variables.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: We adopt the notation for UCB and 1CB,i introduced in the proof of Lemma 2. In addition, let K ′CB be defined in a
similar manner as UCB such that K ′
C
B,i =⊥ if UCB,i =⊥ and K ′CB,i = K ′B,i otherwise. Also, let 1CB be the vector of indicator
random variables 1CB,i, j = 1, . . . , N1.
Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 2, we have
H(Y n2 |W1Y n12 SnΘ2UC) = H(UCB |W1Y n12 SnΘ2UC) (110)
= H(K ′CB|W1Y n12 SnΘ2UC) ≥ H(K ′CB|1CBW1Y n12 SnΘ2UC) (111)
= H(K ′CB|1CB)− I(K ′CB;W1Y n12 SnΘ2UC |1CB) (112)
But, from the MDS property of GK′
B
, and the fact that KB is uniformly distributed over its alphabet, we have
H(K ′CB|1CB) =
N1∑
i=1
min(i, kB) Pr


∑
j=1
1CB,j = i

 = E
{
min
(
kB ,
N1∑
i=1
1CB,i
)}
. (113)
Also,
I(K ′CB ;W1Y
n1
2 S
nΘ2UC |1CB) (a)= I(K ′CB;Y n12 Sn1 |1CB) ≤ I(K ′CB1CB;Y n12 Sn1) ≤ I(KB;Y n12 Sn1). (114)
where (a) follows from the fact that the distribution of W2 (uniform and independent of Sn,ΘA,Θ2) implies that UC is
independent of ΘA, Sn and using this we can argue that the following is Markov chain
K ′CB − (1CB, Y n12 , Sn1)− (W1,Θ2, UC).
By substituting back we obtain the claim of the lemma.
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APPENDIX B
RATE CALCULATION
A. Honest-but-curious users
The rate achieved for user j is Rj = limn→∞ Njn . Compared to the non-secure 1-to-K protocol we have an overhead of n1
transmissions. We have
lim
n→∞
kj
n
= Rj
1−
∏K
k=1
δk
δj
1−∏Kk=1 δk , (115)
and thus
lim
n→∞
kj + k
3/4
j
n
= Rj
1−
∏K
k=1
δk
δj
1−∏Kk=1 δk , (116)
lim
n→∞
n1
n
= max
j∈{1,...,K}
Rj(1−
∏K
k=1
δk
δj
)
(1− δj)
∏
K
k=1 δk
δj
(1−∏Kk=1 δk) . (117)
Using Theorem 1 the rate assertion of Theorem 3 follows.
B. Dishonest user
Similarly as in the honest-but-curious case, we need to compute limn→∞ n1n and limn→∞
max{n′
2
,n′′
2
}
n . It is immediate that
lim
n→∞
n′2
n
=
R1
1− δ1 +
R2
1− δ1δ2 (118)
lim
n→∞
n′′2
n
=
R1
1− δ1δ2 +
R2
1− δ2 (119)
Further
lim
n→∞
kB
n
= R1
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2 (120)
lim
n→∞
kC
n
= R2
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2 , (121)
from which
lim
n→∞
k1
n
= R1
1− δ2
δ2(1− δ1δ2) (122)
lim
n→∞
k2
n
= R2
1− δ1
δ1(1− δ1δ2) , (123)
and
lim
n→∞
n1
n
= max
(
R1
1− δ2
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2) , R2
1− δ1
δ1(1− δ2)(1 − δ1δ2)
)
. (124)
We also observe that
R1
1− δ2
δ2(1− δ1)(1 − δ1δ2) > R2
1− δ1
δ1(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2) ⇔
R1
1− δ1 +
R2
1− δ1δ2 >
R1
1− δ1δ2 +
R2
1− δ2 . (125)
From these the rate assertion of Theorem 4 follows.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF DISTRIBUTION INDEPENDENT SECURITY
We need to show that if Bob is honest, then (18) holds. In the proof we omit taking the maximum, but our argument is true
for all joint distributions of (W1,W2), hence the property follows.
We can almost identically follow the proof of Appendix VI-C. Similarly to (54) we have
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2|W2) ≤ I(W1;Y n2 SnΘ2UC |W2) = I(W1;Y n2 |Y n1+n22 SnΘ2UCW2). (126)
The last step follows because given W2, variables ΘA,Θ2, Sn are independent of W1, further Y n1+n22 , UC are deterministic
functions of ΘA,Θ2,W2, Sn. The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 directly give us
I(KB;Y
n1+n2
2 S
n1+n2) ≤ kBe−c3
√
k1 , (127)
H(Y n2 |Y n1+n22 SnΘ2UCW2) ≤ E
{
MCB
}
, (128)
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under the same conditions as defined in Lemmas 1 and 2, where c3 > 0 is some constant. We still need to show that
H(Y n2 |W1W2Y n1+n22 SnΘ2UC) ≥ E
{
min
(
kB,M
C
B
)}− I(KB;Y n1+n22 Sn1+n2) (129)
holds. We can again follow the proof of Lemma 3, but we have to argue the step
I(K ′CB;W1W2Y
n1+n2
2 S
nΘ2UC |1CB) = I(K ′CB;Y n1+n22 Sn1+n2 |1CB), (130)
where the independent and uniformly distributed property of W2 was exploited when proving the lemma. To see that equation
(130) is true under the modified protocol, consider that K ′C is generated from a different set of random packets than
K ′CB , so K ′
C
B − Y n1+n22 − UC is Markov-chain, and since (ΘA, Sn) is generated independently of (W1,W2,Θ2), K ′CB −
(Y n1+n22 , 1
C
B, S
n1+n2)− (W1,W2,Θ2, UC) has the Markov property too.
Having established the three key lemmas for the modified protocol, we can conclude the proof the same way as we have
seen in Section VI. We omit the details to avoid repetitive arguments.
APPENDIX D
PROOFS OF LEMMAS IN SECTION VII
We note that the order of proofs does not follow the order of appearance of the lemmas.
A. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof:
n(R1 +R2 +R3)− E3(1− δ1δ2δ3) ≤ I(Y n1 Y n2 Y n3 Sn;W1W2W3) (131)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y1,iY2,iY3,iSi;W1W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) (132)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y1,iY2,iY3,i;W1W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1Si) (133)
=
n∑
i=1
Pr{Si 6= ∅}I(Y1,iY2,iY3,i;W1W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1, Si 6= ∅) (134)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1)(1 − δ1δ2δ3) (135)
Here, the first inequality is Fano’s inequality, besides, we exploited the independence property of Si. This completes the proof
of the first inequality of the lemma. Further, we also see that
I(Y n1 Y
n
2 Y
n
3 S
n;W1W2W3) ≤ n(R1 +R2 +R3), (136)
which by a similar argument gives the second inequality of the lemma.
B. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: From the same type of derivation as we apply in Lemma 7, we have that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Si−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1 − E1 (137)
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) ≤
nR1
1− δ1δ2 . (138)
Thus,
nR1
1− δ1 − E1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Si−1) (139)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y i−11 Si−1)− I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y i−11 Si−1W1) (140)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y i−11 Si−1) ≤
nR1
1− δ1δ2 +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y i−11 Si−1) (141)
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C. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: The proof follows the same kind of derivation as the proof of Lemma 5. We omit details to avoid repetition.
D. Proof of Lemma 8
Proof: We apply the shorthand W 3 =W1W2W3.
0 ≤ H(Y n1 Sn|Y n2 Y n3 SnW 3) = H(Y n−11 Sn−1|Y n2 Y n3 SnW 3) +H(Y1,nSn|Y n−11 Y n2 Y n3 SnW 3) (142)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1W 3)− I(Y n−11 Sn−1;Y2,nY3,nSn|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1W 3) +H(Y1,n|Y n−11 Y n2 Y n3 SnW 3)
(143)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1W 3)− I(Y n−11 Sn−1;Y2,nY3,n|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1SnW 3) +H(Y1,n|Y n−11 Y n2 Y n3 SnW 3)
(144)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1W 3)− I(Y n−11 Sn−1;Y2,nY3,n|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1Sn /∈ {∅, {1}}W 3) Pr {Sn /∈ {∅, {1}}}
(145)
+H(Y1,n|Y n−11 Y n2 Y n3 Sn−1, Sn = {1},W 3) Pr {Sn = {1}} (146)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1W 3)− I(Y n−11 Sn−1;Xn|Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1W 3)(1− δ2δ3) (147)
+H(Xn|Y n−11 Y n−12 Y n−13 Sn−1W 3)(1 − δ1)δ2δ3 (148)
We do the same steps recursively to obtain the statement of the lemma.
E. Proof of Lemma 9
Proof: From (6), we have
ǫ > I(Y n2 Y
n
3 S
n;W1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1)(1− δ2δ3) (149)
We omitted the intermediate steps that are in the same vein as in the proof of Lemma 7.
F. Proof of Lemma 10
Proof:
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1W2W3) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1)− I(Xi;W2W3|Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1) + I(Xi;W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1) (150)
From (4) and Fano’s inequality we have
I(Y n2 Y
n
3 S
n;W2W3|W1) ≤ I(Y n2 Y n3 Sn;W2W3)− (h2(ǫ) + ǫ). (151)
We expand these terms the same way as we did in the proof of Lemma 7, and we can write
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) + E5. (152)
From the independence property of the messages
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1) ≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W2W3|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1), (153)
where E5 = h2(ǫ)+ǫ1−δ2δ3 . This enables us to use the same idea as in Lemma 7 to bound these terms. Doing so gives us
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1W2W3) ≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1)−
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ2δ3 +
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3 − E
′
2 − E5,
(154)
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where E ′2 = h2(2ǫ)+2ǫ1−δ2δ3 . It remains to give a bound on term (154). From Lemma 9 and after a few basic steps we can arrive to
E4 >
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) (155)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Xi;Y i−11 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1W1) + I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) + I(X1;Y i−11 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1). (156)
From a similar result as in Lemma 7:
I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1δ2δ3 − E6, (157)
where E6 = h2(ǫ)+ǫ1−δ1δ2δ3 . Further, a symmetric result to Lemma 6 shows:
I(X1;Y
i−1
1 |Y i−12 Y i−13 Si−1)
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ2δ3 −
n(R2 +R3)
1− δ1δ2δ3 − E
′
2. (158)
Applying these bounds in (156) and then substituting back to (154) results the claim of the lemma.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 11
Proof: As a first step we define
Adv
∗ss
dis = max
f,PW1 ,w2,σ
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ, w2) = f(W1, w2)} −maxS Pr {S(PW1 , f, w2) = f(W1, w2)}
}
. (159)
As opposed to Advss here w2 is not a random variable but a constant value from W2. Clearly,
Adv
∗ss
dis ≤ Advssdis, (160)
because W2 taking the value w2 with probability 1 is a particular joint distribution W1,W2 can take, so the scope of the
maximization is restricted. We show that Adv∗ssdis = Advssdis.
Adv
ss
dis = max
f,PW1,W2 ,σ
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ,W2) = f(W1,W2)} −maxS Pr {S(PW1 , f,W2) = f(W1,W2)}
}
(161)
= max
f,PW1,W2 ,σ
∑
w2
pW2(w2)
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ,W2) = f(W1,W2)|W2 = w2} (162)
−max
S
Pr {S(PW1 , f, σ,W2) = f(W1,W2)|W2 = w2}
}
(163)
= max
w∗
2
,f,PW1|W2=w∗2
,σ
{
max
A
Pr{A(Y n2 sSnsΘ2, σ, w∗2) = f(W1, w∗2)} −maxS Pr {S(PW1 , f, w
∗
2) = f(W1, w
∗
2)}
}
(164)
= max
f,PW1,w∗2
,σ
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ, w∗2) = f(W1, w∗2)} −maxS Pr {S(PW1 , f, w
∗
2) = f(W1, w
∗
2)}
}
(165)
= Adv∗ssdis . (166)
where the second step follows because there is a certain value w∗2 of W2 that maximizes the expression inside {. . . }, and
moreover this expression depends on PW1|W2 only through PW1|W2=w2 , hence a maximizing joint distribution of W1,W2 is
when W2 takes this particular value with probability 1.
We continue the proof in two steps, first we define a notion of distinguishing security applicable for jointly distributed
messages by extending a similar definition in [13] and show its equivalence with the above definition of semantic security.
Then we show equivalence between this notion of distinguishing security and distribution independent security as defined
by Advmisdis .
We define a notion corresponding to distinguishing security by defining the adversarial advantage:
Adv
ds
dis = maxA,w0
1
,w1
1
,w2,σ
2Pr
{A(w01 , w11 , w2, bY n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ) = b}− 1, (167)
where w01 , w11 ∈ W1 are possible messages, similarly w2 ∈ W2, b is a variable uniformly distributed over {0, 1} and is
independent of all other variables, while bY n2 is Calvin’s observation given W1 = wb1.
Distinguishing security defined by Advdsdis is equivalent to semantic security as defined by Adv
∗ss
dis and hence equivalently
as defined by Advssdis. To show that distinguishing security implies semantic security, we can almost identically follow the
proof of Theorem 5 from [13], with a slight difference that a conditioning on W2 appears. Given an adversary Ass attacking
semantic security, we construct an adversary Ads attacking distinguishing security as follows: Ads outputs 1, if the adversary
25
attacking semantic security Ass gives as output f(w11 , w2), otherwise it returns 0. Then, if W 01 and W 11 are i.i.d. both having
the same distribution as W1, then
Pr
{Ads(W 01 ,W 11 ,W2, 1Y n2 ,Sn,Θ2, σ) = 1|W2 = w2} = Pr {Ass(Y n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ,W2) = f(W1,W2)|W2 = w2} (168)
Pr
{Ads(W 01 ,W 11 ,W2, 0Y n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ) = 1|W2 = w2} ≤ maxS Pr {S(PW1 , f,W2) = f(W1,W2)|W2 = w2} . (169)
Finishing the derivation as in [13] we get
Pr {Ass(Y n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ,W2) = f(W1,W2)|W2 = w2} −maxS Pr {S(PW1 , f,W2) = f(W1,W2)|W2 = w2}
≤ max
w0
1
,w1
1
,w2,Ads,σ
2Pr
{Ads(w01 , w11, w2, bY n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ) = b}− 1
for all PW1 , f,Ass, σ, hence taking the maximum over these variables on the LHS and over w2 on both sides keeps the
inequality. This establishes that
Adv
ss
dis = Adv
∗ss
dis ≤ Advdsdis ≤ 2Advssdis. (170)
The other direction of implication is a straightforward consequence of the definitions, the scope of maximization in Advdsdis
is a subset of that of Advssdis, in case of Adv
ds
dis f is a function that computes b, while PW1,W2 is such that W1 uniformly
takes the two values w01 and w11 and independently W2 takes w2 with probability 1.
What remains to show is that distinguishing security defined by Advdsdis is equivalent to distribution independent security
as defined by Advmisdis . Clearly, for any particular value of w2,
Adv
mis
dis ≥ max
PW1 ,σ
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2|W2 = w2). (171)
If we fix w2 for the scheme, we can directly invoke Theorem 5 from [13] which proves that
max
A,w0
1
,w1
1
,σ
2Pr
{A(w01 , w11 , w2, bY n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ) = b}− 1 ≤√2 max
PW1 ,σ
I(W1;Y n2 S
nΘ2|W2 = w2) ≤
√
2 ·Advmisdis , (172)
which holds for every w2, so we can take the maximum in w2 on the LHS, which gives in turn
Adv
ds
dis ≤
√
2 ·Advmisdis (173)
showing that the distribution independent security implies distinguishing security. The other direction is also true. We can
apply the same type of argument as when showing Advssdis = Adv
∗ss
dis to get:
Adv
mis
dis = max
PW1,W2 ,σ
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2|W2) (174)
= max
w2,PW1 ,σ
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2|W2 = w2). (175)
Let us denote
Adv
ds(w2) = maxA,w0
1
,w1
1
,σ
2Pr
{A(w01 , w11 , w2, bY n2 , Sn,Θ2, σ) = b}− 1, (176)
We can apply Theorem 4.9 from [13] with a conditioning on W2 = w2, which implies that for any w2:
max
PW1 ,σ
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘ2|W2 = w2) ≤ 2Advds(w2) log
(
2n
Adv
ds(w2)
)
. (177)
Since the above is true for any w2, we can take the maximum in w2 on both sides resulting
Adv
mis
dis ≤ 2Advds log
(
2n
Adv
ds
)
. (178)
This completes the proof that distribution independent security is equivalent to semantic security defined by Advssdis.
